By Lily L. Tsai
This e-book examines the elemental factor of the way voters get govt officers to supply them with the roads, faculties, and different public providers they want via learning groups in rural China. In authoritarian and transitional platforms, formal associations for containing govt officers responsible are usually vulnerable. the reply, Lily L. Tsai came upon, lies in a community's social associations. even if formal democratic and bureaucratic associations of responsibility are vulnerable, govt officers can nonetheless be topic to casual principles and norms created by way of group solidary teams that experience earned excessive ethical status in the neighborhood.
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Extra resources for Accountability Without Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China
13 In Shanxi province, retired government ofﬁcials in an old revolutionary district have formed an association to raise funds for rural development (lao gemin qu jianshe chu jinhui). In some villages, these informal arrangements have worked out well, but in others these arrangements do not produce any useful outcomes and are merely for show. Higher-level ofﬁcials can coopt these arrangements for their own beneﬁt. In Fujian province, one village ofﬁcial noted of the adoption system by higher-level bureaus: “The tuanwei, supervision bureau, planning committee, or the general ofﬁce of the county Party committee, however, has no money and no power.
26 P1: SBT 0521871976c02 CUNY805/Tsai 978 0 521 87197 6 September 22, 2007 18:8 2 Decentralization and Local Governmental Performance Before we can evaluate the performance of local governments, we must ﬁrst understand what their responsibilities are and how ﬁnancial and administrative responsibilities are allocated among different levels of government. To provide a backdrop for the book’s analysis of village governmental public goods provision, this chapter brieﬂy sketches the broader institutional context in which local governments operate.
Wong, “Do Politicians Jeopardize Professionalism? Decentralization and the Structure of Corporate Boards” (2002); Martin Dimitrov, “The Dark Side of Federalism: Decentralization and the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Laws,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 2004. 1. Number of Administrative Units in the Chinese Government (2003) Level of Government Number of Units Central government Provincial-level Municipalities and prefectures County-level Township-level Administrative villages 1 31 333 2,861 44,067 678,589 Source: 2004 Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics, Beijing, China.